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INTRODUCTION 
Ambiguous terms in an insurance contract are typically construed in favor of the 
insured. Nevertheless, this Court adopted an interpretation favoring the insurer. 
Other courts have construed an "insured contract" as a contract whose substance is 
the affirmative assumption of liability because, under the factual circumstances presented 
to those courts, the "insured contract" clause acted as an exclusion from coverage. The 
strict interpretation was adopted by those courts because, otherwise, "commercial liability 
insurance would be severely limited in its coverage." Gibbs M. Smith. Inc. v. United 
States Fid. & Guar.. 949 P.2d 337, 341 (Utah 1997). In other words, the clause was 
interpreted in favor of coverage for the insured. 
By granting the same restrictive interpretation to Chubb's use of the term "insured 
contract" under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court erred. The dispute 
before the Court centered on an extension of coverage, not an exclusion of coverage. 
Therefore, the Court should reverse its decision and reverse the district court's ruling. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE IN CHUBB'S INSURANCE 
POLICY MUST BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF 
COVERAGE BECAUSE, IN THIS CASE, THE LANGUAGE 
ACTS AS AN EXTENSION OF COVERAGE. 
The Court's affirmation of the district court's ruling was based on the following 
reasoning: 
The phrase "liability assumed by the insured under any insured 
contract" has been plainly and reasonably construed by courts "to 
apply only to indemnification and hold-harmless agreements, 
whereby the insured agrees to 'assume' the tort liability of another." 
Memorandum Decision filed December 31. 1998 at p. 2 (quoting Gibbs M. Smith. Inc. v. 
United States Fid. & Guar.. 949 P.2d 337, 341 (Utah 1997)). The Court then noted that 
Wagon Tongue never entered into an indemnity agreement or a hold-harmless agreement 
with Catherine Jacobsen. 
The connotation of an "insured contract" adopted by the Gibbs court was adopted 
because the language at issue is ambiguous. Therefore, the court construed the language 
against the insurer in order to provide insurance coverage to the insured. 
By adopting the Gibbs connotation in this case, the Court violated a fundamental 
principle of contract interpretation. The Court construed the language contained in 
Chubb's policy to favor Chubb even though it is required to construe all ambiguous 
2 
language contained in Chubb's insurance policy in favor of Chubb's insured. See, e.g.. 
Hardv v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co.. 787 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1990) ("[W]e note a 
fundamental principle operative in this case: 'any ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language of an insurance policy must be resolved in favor of coverage. Also, since the 
policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are construed against that party.'") (quoting 
LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988)); see also Wagner v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 786 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah App. 1990); see also Wilbum v. Interstate 
Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 at n.2 (Utah App. 1988). 
It is a longstanding principle of insurance contract interpretation that words and 
phrases used to exclude coverage are to be interpreted in one manner and words and 
phrases used to extend coverage are to be interpreted in another manner. 
[I]nsofar as the cases involve insurance policies, they can be roughly 
divided into cases involving policies excluding from coverage . . . 
and those extending coverage. . . . [I]n the extension cases the 
questioned terms are broadly interpreted, while in the exclusion 
cases the same terms are given a much more restricted 
interpretation. This is necessary because in both situations the 
courts favor an interpretation in favor of coverage.... [T]hese 
cases illustrate that the interpretation of the terms involved is not 
fixed but varies according to the circumstances of the case. They 
also demonstrate that most courts will interpret the terms so as to 
extend the coverage if this can be done under any reasonable 
interpretation of the facts. 
Geico v. Dennis 645 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted); see also Workmen's 
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Auto's Brief at pp. 6-7; Workmen's Auto's Reply Brief at n. 1. 
Because Gibbs — like all of the cases cited therein — was an exclusion case, the 
language at issue was properly interpreted in a restrictive manner. This case, however, is 
an extension case, and the adoption by this Court of Gibbs's restrictive interpretation of 
the same ambiguous language was improper. 
Chubb's named-insured assumed the tort liability of its employee pursuant to its 
contract of employment, thus Chubb's liability coverage is primary: 
[T]his Coverage Form's Liability Coverage is primary for any 
liability assumed under . . . [t]hat part of any . . . contract or 
agreement pertaining to your business . . . under which you 
assume the tort liability of another to pay for . . . "property 
damage" to a third party . . . . 
Chubb Coverage Form at Section IV(B)(5)(c) and V(F)(5). The phrase "any liability . . . 
assumed under . . . any contract or agreement" is very broad. See, e.g.. Viking Ins. Co. v. 
Coleman, 927 P.2d 661 (Utah App. 1996) (adopting a broad interpretation of the "arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a vehicle" clause so long as there is a causal 
nexus between an accident or injury and the insured vehicle). Thus, the language should 
be given its broadest interpretation in order to provide coverage to the insured. See Fuller 
v. Director of Finance. 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 1985) ("An insured is entitled to the 
broadest protection he could have reasonably understood to be provided by the policy."). 
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Workmen's Auto's interpretation of Chubb's policy is reasonable and should be adopted 
in order to afford coverage to Chubb's insured. 
II. THE PRIOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
"INSURED CONTRACT" LANGUAGE IS UNAVAILING. 
Sometimes when language has been given a prior judicial interpretation, it is not 
considered ambiguous. See Draughon v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y. 771 P.2d 1105 at n. 5 
(Utah App. 1989). However, this exception only applies when the prior judicial 
interpretation is applied to the same language under the same factual circumstances. 
As explained above, the language at issue has only been interpreted as an 
exclusion from coverage. Prior judicial interpretation of "insured contract" when it acted 
as an exclusion is irrelevant where, as here, the language used by the insurer acts as an 
extension of coverage to the insured. See Geico v. Dennis 645 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982). 
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III. CHUBB IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR LIMITING ITS 
EXPOSURE. 
The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly explained that this Court "will 
not insert words into a policy under the guise of interpretation where the insurer could 
have easily avoided the problem by drafting its policy more carefully and precisely." 
Draughon v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y. 771 P.2d 1105 (Utah App. 1989). If Chubb did not 
want to provide primary coverage for the acts of its insureds' employees when driving 
their own vehicles, it could have refused to do so. But: 
When an insurance company, in drafting its policy of insurance, uses 
a "slippery" word to mark out and designate those who are insured 
by the policy, it is not the function of the court to sprinkle sand upon 
the ice by strict construction of the term. All who may, by any 
reasonable construction of the word, be included within the coverage 
afforded by the policy should be given its protection. If, in the 
application of this principle of construction, the limits of coverage 
slide across the slippery area and the company falls into a coverage 
somewhat more extensive than it contemplated, the fault lies in its 
own selection of the words by which it chose to be found. 
Geico v. Dennis 645 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). 
Chubb was not required to provide an exception to the general rule that primary 
coverage is provided by the vehicle's owner. However, Chubb chose to provide primary 
coverage under the facts of this case. The Court should not protect Chubb from its own 
election. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should reverse its decision and the district 
court's ruling. The Court should then enter a summary judgment in favor of Workmen's 
Auto and, because Chubb's coverage was concurrently primary, order Chubb to pay the 
sum of $3,790.95 plus prejudgment interest to Workmen's Auto. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY pursuant to Utah R. App. 35 that this Petition for Rehearing 
submitted this ^ day of January, 1999 is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
TRENT J. WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Workmen's Auto Insurance Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ day of January, 1999, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing WORKMEN'S AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING was mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Eric C. Singleton, Esq. 
201 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brett Marshall Godfrey, Esq. 
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